Using a variety of different results from the literature, I show how causal discovery with experiments is limited unless substantive assumptions about the underlying causal structure are made. These results undermine the view that experiments, such as randomized controlled trials, can independently provide a gold standard for causal discovery. Moreover, I present a concrete example in which causal underdetermination persists despite exhaustive experimentation, and argue that such cases undermine the appeal of an interventionist account of causation as its dependence on other assumptions is not spelled out.
Introduction
Causal search algorithms based on the causal Bayes net representation (Spirtes et al. 2000; Pearl 2000) have primarily focused on the identification of causal structure using passive observational data. The algorithms build on assumptions that connect the causal structure represented by a directed (acyclic) graph among a set of vertices with the probability distribution of the data generated by the causal structure. Two of the most common such bridge principles are the causal Markov assumption and the causal faithfulness assumption. The causal Markov assumption states that each causal variable is probabilistically independent of its (graphical) non-descendents given its (graphical) parents. Causal Markov enables the inference from a probabilistic dependence between two variables to a causal connection and from a causal separation to a statistical independence. The precise nature of such causal separation and connection relations is fully characterized by the notion of d-separation (Geiger et al. 1990; Spirtes et al. 2000, 3. 7.1). The causal faithfulness assumption can be seen as the converse to the Markov assumption. It states that all and only the independence relations true in the probability distribution over the set of variables are a consequence of the Markov condition. Thus, faithfulness permits the inference from probabilistic independence to causal separation, and from causal connection to probabilistic dependence. Together causal Markov and faithfulness provide the basis for causal search algorithms based on passive observational data. For the simplest case they are combined with the assumptions that the causal structure is acyclic and that the measured variables are causally sufficient, i.e. that there are no unmeasured common causes of the measured variables. For example, given three variables x, y and z, if we find that the only (conditional or unconditional) independence relation that holds among the three variables is that x is independent of z given y, then causal Markov and faithfulness allow us to infer that the true causal structure is one of those presented in Figure 1 .
Causal Markov and faithfulness do not determine which of the three causal structures is true, but this underdetermination is well understood for causal structures in general. It is characterized by the so-called "Markov equivalence classes" of causal structures. These equivalence classes consist of sets of causal structures (graphs) that have the same independence and dependence relations among the variables. The three structures in Figure 1 are one such equivalence class. To identify the true causal structure uniquely there are two options: One can make stronger assumptions about the underlying causal model, or one can run experiments. Here I will first focus on the latter to then show that one cannot really do without the former.
I will take an experiment to consist of an intervention on a subset of the variables under consideration. While there are a variety of different types of interventions, I will focus
here on experiments involving so-called "surgical" interventions (Pearl 2000) . In a surgical intervention the intervention completely determines the probability distribution of the intervened variable, and thereby makes it independent of its normal causes. Such an intervention is achieved (at least in principle) by a randomized controlled trial:
whether or not a particular treatment is administered is determined entirely by the randomizing device, and not by any other factors. In a causal Bayes net a surgical intervention breaks the arrows into the intervened variable, while leaving the remaining causal structure intact. It is possible to perform an experiment that surgically intervenes on several variables simultaneously and independently. In that case, of course, all information about the causal relation among intervened variables is lost.
For the three Markov equivalent structures in Figure 1 , a single-intervention experiment intervening only on y would distinguish the three causal structures: It would make x independent of y if the first structure is true, but not for the second and third. And it would make y independent of z if the second structure is true, but not for the first and the third. Together these two considerations show that such an experiment on y would resolve the underdetermination of this Markov equivalence class completely.
Ever since Ronald A. Fisher's work in the 1930s, experiments have come to be seen as the gold standard for causal discovery (Fisher 1935) . This view suggests that if one can perform experiments, then causal discovery is (theoretically) trivial. The recent rise of the interventionist account of causation in philosophy appears to endorse this view, since it holds that just what it is to stand in a causal relation, is the possibility of performing the appropriate kind of experiment (Woodward 2003).
Underdetermination despite Experiments
First the hopeful news: Eberhardt et al. (2005) showed that one can generalize the strategy used to identify the true causal structure in Figure 1 to arbitrary causal structures over N variables: Assuming that causal Markov, faithfulness and causal sufficiency hold, and that the causal structure is acyclic, one can uniquely identify the true causal structure among a set of variables given a set of single-intervention experiments. Generally such a procedure will require several experiments intervening on different variables, but a sequence of experiments that guarantees success can be specified. In either case, whether by strengthening assumptions or using experiments, the results rely on the assumption of causal sufficiency -that there are no unmeasured common causes. In many discovery contexts it is implausible that such an assumption is appropriate. Moreover, part of the rationale for randomized controlled trials in the first place was that a randomization makes the intervened variable independent of its normal causes, whether those causes were measured or not. Thus, if there is an unmeasured common cause u -a confounder -of x and z, then randomizing x would break the (spurious) correlation observed between x and z that is due to the confounder u. However, without the assumption of causal sufficiency, underdetermination returns despite the possibility of experiments. and of the xz edge is c in Figure 2 . If the second structure is true, then in an experiment that intervenes on x, we have cor(x,z) = ab, while if the first structure is true, then cor(x,z)
= ab+c in the same experiment. We can measure the correlations and compare the result to the predictions: In an experiment that intervenes on y, we can determine b by measuring cor(y,z). In an experiment intervening on x, we can determine a by measuring cor(x,y), and we can measure cor(x,z). If cor(x,z)=cor(x,y)cor(y,z)=ab, then the second structure is true, while if the first structure is true, then cor(x,z)≠cor(x,y)cor(y,z), and we can determine c=cor(x,z)-cor(x,y)cor (y,z) . Thus, on the basis of single-intervention experiments alone we are able to resolve the underdertermination. But we had to assume linearity. Eberhardt et al. (2010) show that this approach generalizes: if the causal model is linear (with any non-degenerate distribution on the error terms), but causal sufficiency does not hold, then there is a set of single-intervention experiments that can be used to uniquely identify the true causal structure among a set of variables. This results holds even when the assumptions of acyclicity and faithfulness are dropped. It shows just how powerful the assumption of linearity is. Linearity is sufficient to achieve identifiability even for single intervention experiments, but it is known not to be necessary. Hyttinen et al.
(2011) have shown that similar results can be achieved for particular types of discrete models -so-called noisy-or models. It is currently not known what type of parametric assumption is necessary to avoid single-intervention experimental indistinguishability.
However, there is a weaker result: Appendix 2 contains two discrete (but faithful) parameterizations, one for each of the causal structures in Figure 2 
Interventionism
On the interventionist account of causation, "X is a direct cause of Y with respect to some But there are unusual cases. In Appendix 3 I provide another parameterization (PM3) for the first causal structure in Figure 2 (the one with the extra xz edge). The example and its implications are discussed more thoroughly than can be done here in Eberhardt (unpublished) . PM3 is very similar to PM1 and PM2. In fact, for a passive observation and a single intervention on x, y or z they all imply the exact same distributions. Unlike PM1, PM3 violates the assumption of faithfulness in the double-intervention distribution when x and y are manipulated simultaneously: in PM3 x is independent of z despite being (directly) causally connected.
Violations of faithfulness have been recognized to cause problems for the interventionist account (Strevens 2008). In particular, when there are two causal pathways between a variable p and a variable q that cancel each other out exactly, then an intervention on p will leave p and q independent despite the (double) causal connection. But this case here is different: In the double-intervention distribution intervening on x and y that is crucial to determining whether x is a direct cause of z, there is only one pathway between x and z.
Thus, we are faced here with a violation of faithfulness that does not follow the well- The other part of the interventionist appeal was the apparent independence of the interventionist account from substantive assumptions such as faithfulness that have received little sympathy despite their wide application. This paper suggests that you cannot have both.
Appendix 1:
Theorem: Assuming only causal Markov, faithfulness and acyclicity, n experiments are in the worst case necessary to discover the causal structure among n variables.
Proof: Suppose that every pair of variables in V is subject to confounding. Consequently, independence tests conditional on any non-intervened variable will always return a dependence, since they open causal connections via the unmeasured variables.
Without loss of generality we can assume that the following about the causal hierarchy over the variables is known:
In words: The causal order between x1 and x2 is unknown, but they are both higher in the order than any other variable. To satisfy the order, there must (at least) be a path
x3x4...xn-1xn
Let an experiment E =(J, U) be defined as a partition of the variables in V into a set J and U=V\J, where the variables in J are subject to a surgical intervention simultaneously and independently, and the variables in U are not.
Now note the following:
The only experiments that establish whether x2x1 are experiments with x2 in J1 and x1 not in J1. That is, x2 is subject to an intervention (with possibly other variables) and x1 is not. Select any one such experiment and call it E1=(J1, U1).
Suppose that experiment E1 showed that x2 and x1 were independent, such that the ordering between x1 and x2 remains underdetermined. It follows that n experiments are in the worst case necessary to discover the causal structure.
QED.
The above proof shows that in the worst case a sequence of n experiments is necessary that have intervention sets that intervene on at least n-i variables simultaneously for each integer i in 1<i<n.
Appendix 2:
Parameterization PM1 for Structure 1 in Figure 2 ( (z=1|u=1,v=1,x=1,y=1 Nevertheless, it should be evident that in an experiment intervening on x, y, u and v, the difference between the bold font parameters will indicate that x is a direct cause of z.
